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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the relationship between entrepreneurial founding teams’ (EFTs) 
entrepreneurship motivations and new venture financial and operational performance, 
measured as ‘return on assets’ and ‘firm innovation’. We consecutively introduce the level 
and heterogeneity of EFTs’ autonomous and controlled entrepreneurship motivation as 
potential drivers of new venture performance. Our analyses are based on a sample of 66 
teams representing 142 founders. We observe that EFTs’ level of autonomous and controlled 
entrepreneurship motivation contribute to new venture return on assets. We also find support 
for the negative impact of EFTs’ controlled entrepreneurship motivation on new venture 
innovation. Introduction of the moderating motivation heterogeneity variables uncovers 
complex interactions between EFTs’ levels of entrepreneurship motivation, team member 
motivation heterogeneity, and this study’s dependents. Our findings reveal that motivation 
heterogeneity acts as a positive moderator of the relationship between EFTs’ level of 
autonomous/controlled entrepreneurship motivation and new venture innovation, while it 
emerges as a negative moderator of the relationship between EFTs’ controlled motivation and 
new venture financial performance. Implications for further research are highlighted.  
 
Introduction 
 
New venture creation and development rarely involves a “lonely hero” exploiting a lucrative 
opportunity. Rather, evidence supports the idea that entrepreneurship commonly represents a 
collective activity, whereby teams of entrepreneurs are responsible for creating and managing 
new ventures (McMullen et al., 2008). Ever since Gartner et al. (1994) emphasized that 
organizations are in fact social entities, and that the “entrepreneur in entrepreneurship” is 
more likely to be plural than singular, an increasing number of researchers have shifted their 
attention to the entrepreneurial team phenomenon. Building on prior contributions, Kamm et 
al. (1990) defined an entrepreneurial founding team as “two or more individuals who jointly 
establish a business in which they have an equity interest” (p. 7). Ucbasaran et al. (2003) 
extended this definition to include individuals who “have a key role in the strategic decision-
making of the venture at the time of founding” (p. 109). This study focuses on entrepreneurial 
founding teams (EFTs) of which all members meet these conditions and continue to impact 
the strategic development of the new venture. 
So far, two types of team heterogeneity have dominated research on EFTs. On the one 
hand, prior work has emphasized demographic differences between entrepreneurs. These 
differences are conceptualized as “surface-level” diversity or heterogeneity (Harrison et al., 
1998). Particular interest has been directed to age and/or gender diversity between business 
founders (e.g., Chandler et al., 2005; Chowdhury, 2005). On the other hand, task- or skill-
related heterogeneity (Milliken and Martins, 1996) has equally emerged as a chief topic. 
Though a regularly debated topic, extant work suggests that diversity of skills within EFTs 
increases the pool of cognitive resources, which enables the team to better handle the 
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complexities inherent to new venture emergence and development, thus stimulating new 
venture performance. Widely held indicators of task and skill heterogeneity include 
differences in educational specialization, functional expertise, and industry experience (e.g., 
Chandler et al., 2005).    
In sharp contrast to these demographic diversity and skill differences, for which a link 
between team heterogeneity and firm performance has been established in the context of 
EFTs and top management teams (TMTs) in more established organizations, the issue of 
more psychological characteristics has received far less research attention. Recent 
contributions have, nevertheless, argued that such characteristics are just as likely to affect 
team effectiveness and organizational outcomes (Chowdhury, 2005; Van Knippenberg et al., 
2004). In an empirical study of new venture TMT composition, Ensley and Pearce (2001) and 
Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) shed light on the implications of team cohesion for new venture 
performance. They found that contrary to affective conflicts, cognitive conflicts between 
entrepreneurial team members contribute directly to new venture success. Likewise, when 
evaluating the theoretical basis for demographic diversity in EFTs, Chowdhury (2005) 
established that entrepreneurial team effectiveness builds on team member commitment and 
comprehensiveness in strategic decision-making. This study extends the field of deep-level 
(directly unobservable) team diversity by exploring the effects of individual motivation 
heterogeneity between entrepreneurial team members on new venture performance. All in all, 
however, motivation remains a highly neglected variable in team heterogeneity research (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2004). 
According to Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Gagné and Deci, 2005), people can 
adhere to a task with eagerness and volition because they genuinely enjoy doing it, or because 
the task at hand feels personally important (autonomous motivation). In contrast, they can 
engage in an activity with a sense of pressure, because they wish to attain certain rewards that 
are dependent upon task completion, or because they strive for outside approval (controlled 
motivation). Hence, in an entrepreneurial setting, ‘autonomous entrepreneurship motivation’ 
causes individuals to engage in new firm formation and development simply because they 
find this activity enjoyable and derive satisfaction from it, or because they are deeply 
committed to becoming an entrepreneur and wish to maintain their business. ‘Controlled 
entrepreneurship motivation’, on the contrary, provokes individuals to create and develop 
new ventures because of the anticipated rewards (including social rewards), or because they 
appreciate the status associated with being an entrepreneur while evading the stigma of 
business failure. Though autonomous and controlled motivation both elicit and sustain 
purposeful behavior, they are governed by distinctive mechanisms (Gagné and Deci, 2005) 
and are aimed at different objectives (Deci et al., 1999) that arise from a particular ‘locus of 
causality’ (DeCharms, 1968). Despite these inconsistencies, in the research specific to 
entrepreneurial team heterogeneity little is known about the effect of motivational team 
composition on new venture performance.  
This study aims to make the following two contributions to existing literature. First, it 
encompasses a theoretical perspective. It draws on motivation theory, specifically SDT 
(Gagné and Deci, 2005), to introduce autonomous and controlled motivation as EFT 
psychological driving forces of new venture performance. By exploring motivational 
differences in the context of EFTs, we wish to corroborate the idea that factors other than 
demographic diversity and skill differences affect team effectiveness and organizational 
outcomes (Chowdhury, 2005). This research gap not only concerns research on private firms 
owned by EFTs, but also that addressing TMTs in general. While we acknowledge that the 
relationships found in this study, due to differences in individual risk bearing, ownership and 
decision-making power (Ucbasaran et al., 2003), may not necessarily hold for TMTs in 
established firms, they could inspire researchers and policy-makers to broaden their view of 
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team-based venture determinants to include diversity in psychological and personality 
characteristics. A second contribution of the current study encompasses an empirical 
perspective. How to define and measure new venture performance has long been debated. 
Both financial and operational conceptualizations have been advocated. It is therefore 
appropriate to be skeptical about how to best capture new venture performance. We address 
this issue by investigating two performance outcomes: one grounded in audited financial 
information, and another in operational data. From a financial standpoint, we define new 
venture performance in terms of the company’s profitability relative to its total assets (return 
on assets), whereas from an operational standpoint we focus on new ventures’ innovation 
performance. 
This article proceeds as follows: First, we capture the notion of autonomous and 
controlled entrepreneurship motivation and discuss its anticipated model impacts. We 
identify gaps in existing research and formulate five hypotheses to be tested. Next, we 
describe our research methodology, with special emphasis on our sampling procedures, 
measures and measurement validity tests. Hypotheses developed in this study were tested 
using data from 142 individual entrepreneurs representing 66 EFTs. Finally, we present and 
discuss our findings, after which we conclude with some caveats and opportunities for future 
research. 
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
 
Motivation is the internal disposition that initiates, reinforces and maintains goal-oriented 
behaviors. It is the psychological drive that encourages individuals to take action, whether it 
is to eat when we feel hungry, or to enroll in a university to obtain a degree. A considerable 
part of motivation research interest has been aimed at understanding work-related behavior. 
As classics in organizational behavior literature, the theories of Maslow (1954), Herzberg 
(1966), Alderfer (1972), and McClelland (1961) are generally referred to as ‘content theories 
of motivation’ as they attempt to explain ‘what’ motivates behavior, yet fail to shed light on 
‘how’ motivation occurs. ‘Process theories of motivation’, on the other hand, do not primarily 
deal with the energizers of motivation (i.e., needs-based approach), but pay attention to ‘how’ 
individuals direct work-related behavior (e.g., Adams, 1963; Porter and Lawler, 1968; 
Vroom, 1964). Since the objective of the current study is to examine how entrepreneurial 
behavior is rationalized and maintained in the context of EFTs, rather than to explore internal 
energizers of entrepreneurial action, we build on motivation process theories to develop our 
hypotheses. More specifically, this study is rooted in the expectancy approach to motivation.  
According to Vroom (1964), individuals’ work motivation is the product of three 
catalysts: putting forth effort will lead to performance; performance will trigger rewards; and 
these rewards are desirable. Similar to Vroom (1964), Porter and Lawler (1968) stipulate that 
task completion is dependent on its anticipated rewards. Porter and Lawler (1968), however, 
extended Vroom’s (1964) theory by categorizing rewards as intrinsic or extrinsic, thereby 
proposing a model of intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation. ‘Intrinsic motivation’ involves 
individuals engaging in a task because of the spontaneous satisfaction and sense of 
achievement that arise upon successful task completion. ‘Extrinsic motivation’, in contrast, 
emanates from outside the individual. In this case, motivation and satisfaction do not 
originate from the task itself, but from the rewards to which the task is instrumental. Though 
commonly accepted as an adequate theory for explaining task motivation, Porter and 
Lawler’s (1968) Expectancy Theory is not without controversy. Especially its implicit 
additivity assumption of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, thus yielding total job satisfaction, 
has been subject to widespread debate (Deci et al., 1999). Consequently, when positing their 
SDT, Deci and Ryan (1985) no longer acknowledged motivation as a unitary concept. 
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Instead, they emphasized the relative strength of ‘autonomous motivation’ versus ‘controlled 
motivation’, rather than sustaining the concept of ‘total motivation’.  
Capitalizing on Porter and Lawler’s (1968) dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation, Deci and Ryan (1985) differentiate between ‘autonomous motivation’ and 
‘controlled motivation’. Autonomous motivation involves doing a task because it is 
inherently fun (subscale: ‘intrinsic motivation’) or because task accomplishment is 
considered personally important (subscale: ‘identified regulation’). The latter designates an 
internalized form of extrinsic motivation, whereby individuals have come to personally value 
work-related behaviors and understand their importance for their own well-being (Ryan and 
Deci, 2000). Nonetheless, identified regulation is still considered a type of extrinsic 
motivation as it does not involve personal interest in the task at hand, yet requires an 
instrumentality between the task and individually appreciated goals (Gagné and Deci, 2005). 
Contrary to autonomous motivation, controlled motivation encompasses actions unilaterally 
initiated and maintained by external contingencies (subscale: ‘external regulation’ or 
‘extrinsic motivation’) as well as behaviors enacted with a feeling of pressure to avoid self-
inflicted punishment, such as shame or guilt (subscale: ‘introjected regulation’) (Deci and 
Ryan, 1985). Though equally internalized, introjected regulation, as opposed to identified 
regulation, skews more strongly towards pure extrinsic motivation. This type of motivation is 
not perceived as congruent with personal objectives, which causes it to be considered less 
valuable and important (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Hence, with controlled motivation, the cause 
of the behavior is said to have an external ‘perceived locus of control’ (DeCharms, 1968). 
Conversely, autonomous motivation originates from an internal ‘perceived locus of control’, 
so that individuals feel (relatively) autonomous while performing the activities (DeCharms, 
1968).  
While several studies have supported the autonomous-controlled dichotomy as an 
adequate approach to study work motivation, few have tested the theory within an 
entrepreneurial setting. Instead, research on entrepreneurship motivation has largely 
concentrated on push-pull factors as predictors of firm activities. Distinguishing between 
autonomous and controlled motivation is, however, particularly insightful to entrepreneurship 
literature. Several arguments support this view. First, the autonomous-controlled dichotomy 
incorporates what is already known in terms of the push-pull strand in entrepreneurship 
research (Segal et al., 2005). For instance, autonomous motivation implies a sense of volition 
(pull), whereas controlled motivation implies a sense of pressure (push) (Gagné and Deci, 
2005). As a result, the motives sustaining entrepreneurial behavior as recognized by the push-
pull perspective correspond to those accommodated by the controlled-autonomous 
perspective. Second, contrary to push-pull motives, autonomous and controlled motivation 
transcend pre-launch or launch activities of entrepreneurship. They thus can be employed to 
ascertain post-entry alterations in motivations of practicing entrepreneurs. Third, the 
autonomous-controlled distinction can be applied to a specific (individual or team-based) 
activity, a project, or an entire profession. The push-pull debate, on the other hand, only 
produces a classification at person-level, thereby disregarding any task-level motivational 
differences. Finally, while autonomous and controlled motivation trigger and sustain 
purposeful behavior in a diverse way, they are not considered mutually exclusive (Cameron, 
2001). Ryan and Deci (2000) posit that individual actions may be simultaneously motivated 
by a combination of autonomous and controlled factors operating in a parallel fashion. 
Accordingly, autonomous motivation does not exclude an individual from seeking rewards, 
and controlled motivation does not prohibit task enjoyment. This does, however, imply that 
external contingencies (in case of autonomous motivation) or task interestingness (in the case 
of controlled motivation) might be insufficient to maintain motivation.  
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When making predictions, much of the work in motivation literature unilaterally 
considers the amount of ‘total motivation’ a person has for a task, thereby ignoring 
subdimensional types of motivation. Gagné and Deci (2005) warn against treating motivation 
as a unitary concept. They argue that determining motivation by various factors is of little use 
if it is then operationalized into a single variable. Not only does this induce the reification of 
the motivation construct, it also fails to capture any underlying variations between types of 
motivation. That is why, consistent with Gagné and Deci (2005), the current study 
differentiates between EFTs’ autonomous and controlled entrepreneurship motivation.  
We know from the field of work motivation and regulated behavior that autonomous 
and controlled motives aim at achieving separate goals (Deci and Ryan, 1985) that arise from 
a different ‘perceived locus of causality’ (DeCharms, 1968). Though autonomous motivation 
effects have emerged as the most stable, both types of motivation are said to elicit and sustain 
purposeful behavior (Deci and Ryan, 2000). Within the entrepreneurship field, Herron and 
Robinson (1993) identified entrepreneurial motivation as a key factor influencing venture 
performance. Specifically, accumulating wealth, monetary compensation and building equity 
in the firm (i.e., external contingencies) have long been recognized as important propellers of 
entrepreneurial behavior (Langan-Fox and Roth, 1995; Shepherd and DeTienne, 2005). 
According to Campbell (1992), individuals initiate, maintain and develop businesses if their 
expected present value of entrepreneurship exceeds that of being an employee. Within SDT, 
we know that when behavior is thus motivated, it suggests the financial performance of the 
venture becomes instrumental to attain personally desired outcomes (e.g., wealth 
accumulation, outside approval) or to avoid undesired ones (e.g., business failure, shame, 
guilt). Therefore, we believe that with higher levels of controlled motivation, entrepreneurs, 
either alone or as part of a team, will be increasingly energized into actions that foster new 
ventures’ financial performance.  
Yet, not all entrepreneurial behavior is coerced or seduced by (introjected) external 
objectives. Kuratko et al. (1997: p.31) established that goals “of both an intrinsic and 
extrinsic nature” are vital for sustaining entrepreneurship. Similarly, in their meta-analysis, 
Carsrud and Brännback (2011) argue that while most researchers assume entrepreneurship to 
be a pursuit of instrumental economic goals, substantial evidence exists of people engaging in 
entrepreneurship without any apparent (dominant) reward other than task enjoyment. There 
exists, however, relatively little research that has explored how autonomous entrepreneurship 
motivation impacts new venture performance. Turning to educational psychology literature, 
we learn that when activities are experienced as spontaneously satisfying and/or personally 
important, people tend to persistently exert effort, be eager to acquire additional knowledge, 
and show improved creativity (Deci et al., 2001; Wigfield et al., 2004). Since autonomous 
motivated behaviors satisfy SDT’s basic needs of competence, autonomy and relatedness 
(Deci and Ryan, 1985), engaging in such activities facilitates positive outcomes such as task 
engagement, work performance, psychological well-being and behavioral persistence (Baard 
et al., 2004). Extrapolating this research to an entrepreneurship context, we posit that 
entrepreneurs with advanced levels of autonomous motivation will exert more time and effort 
on business development, display more creativity and task engagement, and achieve higher 
functional effectiveness, which ultimately should reflect in new ventures’ financial 
performance. In sum, we hypothesize that while some entrepreneurs in EFTs may be (mainly) 
driven by external contingencies (controlled motivation) and others by task enjoyment and 
adopted job-attributes (autonomous motivation), they all share a commitment to pursue the 
business opportunity, develop the new venture and sustain firm ownership. Hence, we believe 
that both types of motivation will trigger EFTs to promote new ventures’ financial 
performance. 
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Hypothesis 1: EFTs’ level of entrepreneurship motivation is positively associated with 
new venture financial performance. This will be reflected by the positive effects of:  
a) EFT autonomous entrepreneurship motivation, and 
b) EFT controlled entrepreneurship motivation. 
       
Despite the analogous anticipated association of EFTs’ autonomous and controlled 
motivation with new venture financial performance, we know from lab experiments and 
research in other domains that both types of motivation may differ in terms of their 
magnitude and intensity. Gagné and Deci (2005) argue that work climates that encourage 
intrinsic motivation or a profound internalization of extrinsic motivation yield improved 
performance compared to climates that are control-oriented. Particularly for activities 
demanding disciplined engagement, intellectual flexibility and complex problem solving 
(e.g., activities related to new venture development), autonomous motivation has turned out 
to be a better predictor of effective performance (Baard et al., 2004). Individuals appear to be 
most creative when they find rewards in the task itself rather than when the task functions as 
a means to an end (Amabile et al., 1990). In contrast, with regards to mundane tasks, 
controlled motivation has been found to better facilitate short-term performance (Grolnick 
and Ryan, 1987). Autonomous motivation produces better quality responses when 
confronting multifaceted situations with high ambiguity. In such situations, which are 
inherent to entrepreneurship, autonomy-oriented individuals appear to manage complex 
problems better than their control-oriented colleagues (Erez et al., 1990). Not only do they 
share a greater awareness of the environment, they also tackle unexpected events more 
successfully. What is more, due to higher levels of excitement they are willing to dedicate 
more personal resources to task fulfillment (e.g., effort and attention).  
Building on the above arguments, we assume that EFTs’ autonomous 
entrepreneurship motivation will exert a stronger influence on new venture financial 
performance compared to their controlled entrepreneurship motivation. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
  
Hypothesis 2: EFTs’ level of autonomous entrepreneurship motivation has a stronger 
effect on new venture financial performance than EFTs’ level of controlled 
entrepreneurship motivation. 
 
Next to financial performance we also focus on new venture operational performance in the 
form of innovation (bringing new goods and services to the market). Innovation is important 
for firms, including new ventures (De Winne and Sels, 2010). It fuels organizations’ 
competitive advantage and stimulates growth and survival. Innovation is, therefore, to some 
degree a goal for many new ventures. Yet, it also involves insecurity and risks (Smith et al., 
2005) and requires (strategic) perseverance. By looking at innovation as a goal, it is tied to 
entrepreneurship motivation (Baum and Locke, 2004). More specifically, controlled 
entrepreneurship motivation is expected to be negatively linked to new venture innovation. 
After all, innovation is a goal rather distant in time, and such goals usually do not generate 
the beneficial (control-oriented) motivational effects of short-term goals (Wood and Bandura, 
1989). Past research, however, suggests that even controlled motivation could have a positive 
effect on creativity and innovation (Eisenberger et al., 1999). More recent research has 
refined that idea and made this effect contingent upon the rewards attached to the innovation 
and/or other circumstantial conditions (Choi, 2004; Prabhu et al., 2006). In view of the 
insecurity and risks attached to new venture innovation we expect that the possible rewards 
attached to it are not strong enough to spur controlled motivation. Instead, stirred by the 
prospect of accumulating wealth, control-motivated EFTs might shorten their time 
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perspectives and lucratively consume available means of production. Although such a modus 
operandi does not particularly favor firm persistence, it may cause more control-oriented 
EFTs to financially outperform primarily autonomous-oriented teams in the short term. The 
level of controlled motivation, thus, is expected to reflect the EFTs’ averseness to any actions 
that might endanger contingent monetary rewards (Deci et al., 2001; Ryan and Deci, 2000). 
Autonomous motivation, on the other hand, should trigger new venture innovation. 
After all, entrepreneurs can make up their own agenda (Baum and Locke, 2004). If they 
consider innovation as something of genuine value, and anticipate that their efforts will lead 
to innovation performance, then autonomous motivation will play a facilitating role in their 
behavioral scheme. Aspects of autonomous motivation have been shown to correlate strongly 
to expectancy beliefs (Gu et al., 2011). This line of reasoning is not entirely new; past 
research has identified intrinsic or autonomous motivation elements as key ingredients to 
individual innovation and creativity (Prabhu et al., 2006). Aimed at new venture continuity 
and long-term fruition, rather than short-term profitability, autonomous motivation is more 
likely to promote strategic investments, calculated risk-taking and the development of a 
sound business foundation in order to achieve more challenging self-set goals (Watson et al., 
1993). While such actions foster long-term organizational responsiveness, they are 
detrimental to new ventures’ short-term financial results. As such, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: EFTs’ level of entrepreneurship motivation is associated with new 
venture innovation performance. This will be reflected by:  
a) The negative effect of EFT controlled entrepreneurship motivation, and 
b) The positive effect of EFT autonomous entrepreneurship motivation. 
 
Given that distinctive mechanisms govern autonomous and controlled motivation (Gagné and 
Deci, 2005), and that a mixture of both types of motives is bound to occur within EFTs, we 
anticipate that team motivation heterogeneity can affect the earlier hypothesized relationships 
between autonomous/controlled entrepreneurship motivation and new venture 
financial/innovative performance. Williams and O’Reilly (1998) distinguish two dominant 
perspectives in the research on performance effects of team diversity: the ‘social 
categorization’ perspective and the ‘information/decision-making’ perspective. The rationale 
behind the social categorization perspective is that people use perceived similarities and 
differences to categorize themselves and others into ‘in’ and ‘out’ social groups. As the 
current study focuses on small EFTs, of which all members own and manage part of the new 
venture, thinking along the lines of such categorizations is not very useful. The second view, 
that is the information/decision-making perspective, is, however, more promising. This 
tradition focuses on the task-related aspects of team processes. Its research interest lies at 
team members’ exchange, discussion and integration of ideas, knowledge and insights 
relevant to the tasks at hand (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Advancing idea and knowledge 
diversity within teams as an informational resource, the information/decision-making 
perspective argues that more diverse groups may outclass more homogeneous ones.  
Contrary to the idea of social groups, it seems reasonable to assume that EFTs’ 
activities involve strong information/decision-making components. This setting, thus, creates 
a rich soil for team diversity or heterogeneity to bear fruits. In the current study, team 
motivation heterogeneity refers to differences among EFT members on deeper-level 
controlled (e.g., differences in terms of external pressures and contingencies driving 
behavior) and/or autonomous motives (e.g., differences in personal values, beliefs, opinions 
and tasks regarded as ‘fun’ to do). Though some authors, while building on social identity 
theory and the similarity-attraction proposition, assume that EFT members are similar to one 
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another (e.g., Cooper and Artz, 1995; Hmieleski et al., 2012), we maintain that they are, in 
fact, less (motivational) homogeneous (and, therefore, more heterogeneous) than one would 
initially assume. After all, motivational differences concern deep-level topics. As a result, it 
may take a considerable amount of time and interaction for entrepreneurship motivational 
diversity to emerge.  
Key to yielding benefits from team motivation heterogeneity is not the mere presence 
of diverse points of view, but the adequate use of the rich information embedded in these 
differences (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). While it is often proposed that conflicts resulting 
from heterogeneity generate performance benefits (e.g., Jehn et al., 1999), we posit that it is 
the creative processing of members’ diverse viewpoints and information that is essentially 
beneficial (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). In fact, to date, research findings on the conflict 
perspective of team heterogeneity are inconclusive (Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007). So, if we 
are to understand the influence of EFTs’ heterogeneity on performance, we need to perceive 
EFTs as information processing entities (Hinsz et al., 1997).  
Capitalizing on the information/decision-making perspective of team diversity, we 
contend that EFTs will process information differently depending on (members’ motivation 
for) the task at hand and its targeted outcome. In general terms, information processing 
encompasses the learning and exchange of perspectives among group members, the 
individual-level processing of this information, the feeding back of processing results to the 
group, and the discussion and integration of member feedback (Van Knippenberg et al., 
2004). Though these information-processing requirements are highly demanding, they have 
been argued to be conducive in the context of complex, cognitive and risky innovations. 
Whenever learning processes resemble the information processing of the team, as is the case 
with new venture innovations, diverse standpoints, orientations and beliefs are essential to 
reach a greater understanding of strategic alternatives (Amason, 1996). In the current study, 
we believe that the value, idea and knowledge diversity embedded in the autonomous and 
controlled entrepreneurship motives of EFT members will challenge the status-quo, spur team 
creativity in solving problems, and ultimately encourage new venture innovation. Hence, we 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Motivation heterogeneity acts as a positive moderator of the 
relationship between EFTs’ level of autonomous/controlled entrepreneurship 
motivation and new venture innovation. This will be reflected by the positive 
moderating effects of:  
a) EFT autonomous entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity, and 
b) EFT controlled entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity. 
 
Given the requirements listed above, it is not surprising that team information processing is to 
some extent an ambiguous and often time-consuming process (Nemeth and Staw, 1989). In 
fact, these requirements may prevent a team from engaging in speedy decision-making and 
achieving swift compromises. Hence, differences in individually valued goals, beliefs and 
cognitive schemas that stem from motivation heterogeneity may disturb the setting for short-
term oriented tasks or objectives that capitalize on such efficient decision-making (e.g., short-
term financial performance). What is more, in order to secure team effectiveness, 
heterogeneously motivated EFTs will have to devote some resources (e.g., time and effort) to 
the reinstatement of group coherence and team consent. Equally motivated team members, in 
contrast, because of their mutual beliefs, values and attributes, might find it much easier to 
develop and sustain short-term communication patterns, group objectives and modi operandi. 
While such communality or homogeneity among EFT members does not particularly favor 
new venture innovation or long-term fruition, we believe it may enable less heterogeneously 
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motivated EFTs to facilitate new venture financial performance, at least in the short term 
(with the latter being related to this study’s dependent). We, therefore, hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Motivation heterogeneity acts as a negative moderator of the 
relationship between EFTs’ level of autonomous/controlled entrepreneurship 
motivation and new venture financial performance. This will be reflected by the 
negative moderating effects of:  
a) EFT autonomous entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity, and 
b) EFT controlled entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity.  
 
Methodology 
 
Sampling procedures 
The sample for this research originates from START 2009, an extensive cross-sectional 
survey on new ventures located in Flanders, Belgium. This is a biennial population survey of 
Flemish incorporated companies that have been in business for one to three years, are active 
within various economic sectors and, in 2009, had a minimum of one and a maximum of 49 
employees. The primary source of data involved a structured interview with each of the new 
ventures’ managers. Face-to-face interviewing allowed for the collection of comprehensive 
information on their educational background, career trajectory and entrepreneurship 
motivations. General information on the new ventures was collected using a questionnaire 
that was mailed prior to the interviews. Finally, financial performance information was 
captured using audited information from Bel-first, which denotes a financial database holding 
information on the company accounts of all firms incorporated under Belgian law. 
The total research population of new ventures consisted of 3183 firms in 2009. Due to 
obsolete company data, 259 new ventures could not be reached. Out of the 2924 
questionnaires mailed, 453 usable company responses (response rate of 15.5%) and 490 
owner interviews were obtained. Within 42% of the responding ventures (190 companies), 
daily management was shared by at least two individuals. To be included as an observation in 
this study, data on both the venture and its founders were required. In order to be considered 
a member of an EFT, respondents had to have an active hand in the founding of the venture, 
own an equity stake of at least 10% and assume a key role in the venture’s current strategic 
decision-making. Interview responses were required from all members of the EFT. Due to a 
lack of data on the new venture and/or on one of its founders, 97 companies had to be 
excluded from further analysis. Another 10 businesses were omitted because their current 
managers did not meet the above criteria. The remaining 83 companies, representing 176 
founders, were further reduced because of the use of listwise exclusion during statistical 
procedures. This resulted in a final sample of 66 ventures, representing 142 founders. Teams 
ranged in size from two to four members. 
Tests between respondent and non-respondent ventures revealed no significant 
differences regarding organization age and size. Using chi-square differences and t-tests, no 
differences emerged regarding industry, size and organization age between the firms used in 
the analyses and those that were eligible yet excluded because of missing values. Similarly, 
no differences were detected pertaining to average age, industry experience and 
entrepreneurship motivation of sampled EFTs and teams whose members did not all meet the 
selection criteria. Finally, a means difference test showed no evidence of financial or 
operational performance variations. While this evidence does not eliminate the concern of 
possible non-response bias, it does indicate a certain level of representativeness of our 
sample.  
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While sample size may be of concern in this study, we would like to point out that 
similar sample sizes have been characterizing much of the team-based literature. For 
example, Olsen et al. (2006) analyzed 66 teams in their study on the mediating role of 
strategic choice between team heterogeneity and firm performance, as did Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990) when investigating the association of environment, technical innovation 
and top management team characteristics on organization sales. West and Schwenk (1996) 
studied 65 firms in search of moderating effects of environmental turbulence on the 
relationship between top management team consensus and firm performance. Finally, 
Talaulicar et al. (2005) called upon 56 teams to examine the influence of new venture team 
organization and processes on the comprehensiveness and speed of strategic decision-
making. 
 
Measures 
New venture financial performance. Following Zahra et al. (2000), we addressed three issues 
in measuring new venture performance. First, we decided to make use of a lagged 
performance measure by averaging financial performance data over the company’s last two 
years. Given this study’s focus on new ventures, a two-year time period should capture 
unusual events in the market, while avoiding the introduction of noise (e.g., changing 
industry structures and firm strategy variations) (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). 
Second, we acquired audited financial information from a separate database more than one 
year after the owner interviews and company questionnaires were concluded. To lessen the 
possible effects of common method variance we decided not to make use of survey method 
data. Instead, using the company’s unique identification number, we retrieved the annual 
accounts of each company from the aforementioned Bel-first database. The final issue 
concerned the selection of an adequate financial performance criterion. We adopted “return 
on assets” (ROA) as an objective accounting measure of new venture performance. As an 
indicator of the profitability of a company relative to its total assets, the ROA sheds light on 
the efficiency of EFTs at using company assets to generate earnings. As a result, ROA 
accurately reflects entrepreneurial effectiveness and the ability of EFTs to create wealth. 
New venture innovation performance. Traditional conceptions of business 
performance largely center on the use of financial accounting measures. These measures 
retrospectively address ventures’ fulfilment of specific economic goals. They, unfortunately, 
do not shed light on firms’ internal effectiveness nor do they reveal any mechanisms that 
drive performance (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). We therefore aimed to complement 
our financial dependent with an operational one to better capture the concept of new venture 
performance.  
One of a firm’s key parameters important for competitive success is its innovation 
performance (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010). Being directly tied to the company’s value 
creation, (product and process) innovations are likely to steer new ventures away from 
potential familiarity, maturity and propinquity competence traps (Liao et al., 2003). They 
elicit organizational learning and new knowledge accumulation (Maes and Sels, 
forthcoming), which strengthens new ventures’ delicate competitive position.  
Research has shown that various operationalizations of organizational innovation 
exist. Following Crossan and Apaydin (2010), we selected three different measures to capture 
three theoretically meaningful dimensions of new ventures’ innovation performance: product 
portfolio, process technologies and served markets. First, we assessed the number of distinct 
types of products or services the firm was offering at the time of the survey. This information 
was transformed into a dummy variable differentiating single-product from multiple-product 
firms. Second, we surveyed the number of process technologies used to create and deliver 
these products or services. Possible values included ‘one dominant technology’ (46.97%), 
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‘two distinct technologies’ (12.12%), or ‘three or more distinct technologies’ (40.91%). 
Third, concentrating on multi-market ventures, we examined the diversity of the markets to 
which the firm targeted its products or services. Answers were scored on a five-point scale 
ranging from ‘very equivalent’ (1) to ‘not equivalent at all’ (5). Together, the above measures 
provide a comprehensive view of new ventures’ innovation performance. An aggregate ten-
point measure that was the sum of the above three measures was calculated for each firm 
(e.g., 10 = multiple-product new venture, relying on minimum three distinct process 
technologies, thereby serving disparate markets).  
EFT level of autonomous and controlled entrepreneurship motivation. To assess 
EFTs’ level of controlled and autonomous entrepreneurship motivation, we first determined 
the entrepreneurship motivation of each of the venture’s founders. For this we adopted the 
Gagné et al. (2010) and Vansteenkiste et al. (2009) inventory, which is grounded in SDT. 
This 12-item inventory assesses four dimensions of work motivation, of which two pertain to 
autonomous motivation (‘intrinsic motivation’ (Cronbach’s alpha = .764) and ‘identified 
regulation’ (Cronbach’s alpha = .729)) and two to controlled motivation (‘external regulation’ 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .692) and ‘introjected regulation’ (Cronbach’s alpha = .851)). Prior 
research has already demonstrated this inventory’s high levels of construct and concurrent 
validity and internal consistency. Although initially aimed at measuring people’s motivation 
for work-related behavior in the context of established organizations (Gagné et al., 2010), the 
items are equally appropriate for measuring motivation of business founders in the context of 
new ventures. Items were scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘not important 
at all’) to 5 (‘extremely important’).  Using the formula suggested by Maes et al. (2005), we 
determined for each founder two factors with scale ranges from 0 to 100: one representing 
autonomous entrepreneurship motivation (Cronbach’s alpha = .827; 6 statements) and 
another representing controlled entrepreneurship motivation (Cronbach’s alpha = .791; 6 
statements). The adopted formula is displayed in the Appendix with all items and factor 
loadings. To determine the EFTs’ level of autonomous (controlled) entrepreneurship 
motivation, we calculated the average autonomous (controlled) motivation among its 
members. 
EFT entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity. Motivation heterogeneity has seldom 
been measured in the context of EFTs. To transform general EFT entrepreneurship 
motivation information into team-based heterogeneity variables, we adopted Allison’s (1978) 
coefficient of variation. This heterogeneity coefficient is constructed of the standard deviation 
divided by the mean. A high score on this coefficient refers to high team heterogeneity, 
whereas a low score denotes low heterogeneity. Using Allison’s (1978) formula, we 
determined EFTs’ intrinsic and extrinsic entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity. 
Control variables. To isolate our hypotheses from possible rival explanations and to 
minimize extraneous variation, we included the following organizational characteristics as 
control variables: firm continuation, EFT size, industry, and environmental turbulence. 
Furthermore, to explore the performance contribution specific to EFT motivations, we also 
controlled for more traditional demographic diversity variables (e.g., gender, education, 
industry experience).  
Although all ventures in our sample are between one and three years of (legal) age, 
not all of them are de novo firms (e.g., take-over of a bankrupt business). This implies that 
the business activities could have been carried out before the current organizations were 
legally established. We control for the possibility of firm continuation by including a dummy 
variable indicating whether the business activities were already operational before the current 
venture was founded. Because team heterogeneity and group size are positively associated 
(Allison, 1978), it is imperative to control for EFT size. Prior work has indicated that larger 
teams are linked to better performance, both at group level and firm level (Eisenhardt and 
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Schoonhoven, 1990). In order to prevent turbulence-originated bias in venture performance, 
we introduced the dynamic nature of the venture’s environment as a control variable 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2003). The scale items used to measure environmental turbulence are 
adapted from Zahra (1993). Respondents were asked to rate six environmental statements on 
a five-point Likert scale. Possible answers varied from ‘entirely disagree’ (1) to ‘entirely 
agree’ (5). Again using the formula suggested by Maes et al. (2005), we created a factor with 
scale ranges from 0 to 100 (Cronbach’s alpha = .855). The adopted formula is displayed in 
the Appendix, along with all items and factor loadings. Because firms in our sample belong 
to various industries, each with their own characteristics, we developed a series of dummy 
variables to control for the different market conditions within each industry. Five dummies 
were included in our analyses, using the manufacturing sector as a reference category. 
Because Ucbasaran et al. (2008) have found a positive relationship between founder 
experience and firm performance, we intended to control for EFTs’ entrepreneurship 
experience. However, since at least one member of every EFT had already actively 
participated in new venture creation, this dummy variable was excluded.  
We again used Allison’s (1978) coefficient of variation to compute the age and 
industry experience heterogeneity between the business founders. Due to collinearity issues 
among the two independents, we were forced to exclude age and age heterogeneity from 
further analysis. The remaining variables of heterogeneity (e.g., gender and educational 
background) were developed using the Herfindal-Hirschman coefficient, also known as the 
Blau categorical index (1977) (H = 1 - ∑pi²). Before calculating the coefficient’s score, we 
assigned the founders’ educational background to one of the following categories: arts, 
sciences, engineering, business and economics, law and other. The above formula produced a 
measure of heterogeneity with its complement being a measure of homogeneity. Though we 
are unable to control for romantic couples, sample conditions did prevent the inclusion of 
ventures in which a spouse was registered as a company partner without being a business 
founder or assuming an active management role.  
 
3.3 Statistical procedures 
Hierarchical multiple regression was used as the statistical procedure to test our hypotheses. 
As far as multivariate statistical tools are concerned, this technique has been subject to an 
impressive set of tests of assumptions (Belsley et al., 1980). It allows investigating the 
contribution above and beyond variables already entered into the regression equation. It also 
enables us to examine the statistical influence of several variables at once. The variables were 
mean-centered before any of the interaction terms were created. The highest VIF statistic 
encountered in the models discussed below was 3.873, which is below the recommended 
maximum value of 5 (Moreno and Casillas, 2008). 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 lists the means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations of this study’s 
variables. All correlations are below .80 in absolute value, which is again an indication 
against the possible presence of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1998). The results of the 
hierarchical regression analyses are displayed in Table 2 (financial performance) and Table 3 
(innovation performance). Models 1, 2, 8 and 9 represent the ‘control models’, which only 
include the aforementioned organizational control variables (Models 1 and 8), and the 
traditional demographic diversity variables (Models 2 and 9). Models 3 and 10 relate to the 
main effects, together with the control variables. We estimated each of the hypothesized 
interaction terms in Models 4 to 7 (financial performance) and Models 11 to 14 (innovation 
performance). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Variables Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1. Return on assets 5.68 20.82 1                  
2. Innovation 4.98 3.13 -.14 1                 
3. Agriculture .08 .27 -.01 -.15 1                
4. Construction .26 .44 .00 .20 -.17 1               
5. Manufacturing .42 .50 .15 -.13 -.25* -.51** 1              
6. Transportation .03 .17 -.06 -.23 -.05 -.10 -.15 1             
7. Banking and insurances .05 .21 -.10 .10 -.06 -.13 -.19 -.04 1            
8. Professional services .17 .38 -.11 .09 -.13 -.26* -.38** -.08 -.10 1           
9. Start-up continuation .00 .49 .02 -.10 .23 .05 -.06 .14 .03 -.22 1          
10. EFT size 2.33 .44 .13 -.11 -.10 -.21 .19 -.06 -.08 .13 -.15 1         
11. Environmental turbulence 46.97 22.10 -.04 .31* -.17 .18 -.19 -.23 -.07 .30* -.38** .01 1        
12. EFT industry experience 13.90 9.31 .10 -.24 .14 -.10 .11 .13 .25* -.34** .35** -.09 -.30* 1       
13. EFT gender heterogeneity 20.94 24.63 -.09 .02 .22 .06 .00 -.15 -.04 -.14 .27* -.13 -.04 -.01 1      
14. 
EFT educational background 
heterogeneity 
20.96 24.62 -.17 .18 .11 -.01 -.24 -.15 -.04 .35** .14 -.11 .24 -.03 -.04 1     
15. 
EFT industry experience 
heterogeneity 
38.66 32.18 -.05 -.26* -.07 -.18 .36** -.20 -.23 .01 -.12 .40** .09 -.20 .07 -.02 1    
16. EFT autonomous motivation 76.56 14.86 .20 -.16 -.13 -.12 .17 .01 .02 -.01 .03 .07 .06 .01 -.18 -.07 .29* 1   
17. EFT controlled motivation 35.82 17.11 .23 -.30* .17 .02 .11 .02 -.02 -.29* .07 -.03 .07 .04 .04 -.15 .17 .26* 1  
18. 
Autonomous motivation 
heterogeneity 
23.87 26.53 -.11 .12 -.08 -.19 -.09 .14 .17 .23 -.09 .08 .00 -.10 -.35** .28* -.07 .33** -.23 1 
19. 
Controlled motivation 
heterogeneity 
112.36 60.44 -.06 .13 -.26* -.12 .03 .03 .00 .28* -.02 .09 -.05 -.04 -.17 .11 .08 .46** -.72** .48** 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 2. Results of Hierarchical Regression Models of New Venture Financial Performance 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Control variables: Organizational characteristics         
 Agriculture -.024 .008 -.034 -.039 -.064 -.019 -,047 
 Construction .045 .081 .044 .022 -.009 .058 ,023 
 Transportation -.062 -.132 -.153 -.144 -.156 -.125 -,123 
 Banking and insurances -.098 -.155 -.182 -.180 -.194 -.150 -,197 
 Professional services -.115 -.049 -.015 -.021 -.042 -.010 ,050 
 Start-up continuation .032 .085 .016 -.022 -.047 .002 ,046 
 EFT size .131 .164 .203 .215 .245 .218 ,178 
 Environmental turbulence -.012 .059 -.024 -.045 -.085 -.040 -,120 
Control variables: Traditional diversity variables        
 EFT industry experience  .095 .099 .105 .090 .070 ,104 
 EFT gender heterogeneity  -.118 -.050 -.013 .026 -.078 -,097 
 EFT educational background heterogeneity  -.167 -.108 -.088 -.039 -.056 -,135 
 EFT industry experience heterogeneity  -.178 -.288* -.304* -.330* -.311* -,263 
Main effects        
 EFT level of autonomous entrepreneurship motivation   .196* .258* .260* .261** ,183 
 EFT level of controlled entrepreneurship motivation   .206* .235* .266** .168 ,112 
Moderators         
 Autonomous entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity    .121 -.044   
 Controlled entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity      -.153 -,322** 
Two-way interactions        
 EFT level of autonomous entrepreneurship motivation x  
autonomous entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity 
   
 
-.212 
 
 
 EFT level of controlled entrepreneurship motivation x             
controlled entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity 
   
 
 
 
-.369** 
         
F-Change .387 1.004 2.519** .602 .533 .801 4.630** 
R² .051 .118 .198 .207 .216 .210 .278 
Notes: Standardized coefficients are shown (two-tailed, with directional hypothesis entries one-tailed); N = 66 start-ups, representing 142 founders;    
***. Significant at the .01 level   -   **. Significant at the .05 level   -   *. Significant at the .10 level. 
 
 
 15 
Table 3. Results of Hierarchical Regression Models of New Venture Innovation Performance 
Variables Model 8 Model 9 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Control variables: Organizational characteristics        
 Agriculture -.177 -.154 -.094 -.090 -.044 -.102 -,081 
 Construction -.159 .000 .016 .034 .090 .009 ,035 
 Transportation -.220* -.208 -.191 -.198 -.177 -.206 -,208 
 Banking and insurances .047 .070 .081 .079 .103 .063 ,097 
 Professional services -.055 -.132 -.197 -.192 -.155 -.200 -,244 
 Start-up continuation .017 .031 .072 .101 .147 .080 ,046 
 EFT size -.100 .036 .011 .002 -.052 .003 ,033 
 Environmental turbulence .228 .213 .288** .304** .376** .296** ,356** 
Control variables: Traditional diversity variables        
 EFT industry experience  -.270** -.279** -.283** -.256* -.263* -,288** 
 EFT gender heterogeneity  .045 .014 -.014 -.085 .030 ,045 
 EFT educational background heterogeneity  .150 .104 .088 -.001 .075 ,134 
 EFT industry experience heterogeneity  -.382*** -.318** -.306** -.260* -.305** -,342** 
Main effects        
 EFT level of autonomous entrepreneurship motivation   -.018 -.066 -.068 -.054 ,004 
 EFT level of controlled entrepreneurship motivation   -.279** -.301** -.357*** -.258** -,216** 
Moderators         
 Autonomous entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity    -.094 .205   
 Controlled entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity      .084 ,209 
Two-way interactions        
 EFT level of autonomous entrepreneurship motivation x  
autonomous entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity 
   
 
.382*   
 EFT level of controlled entrepreneurship motivation x             
controlled entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity 
   
 
  ,273** 
         
F-Change 1.524 2.703** 2.664* .466 2.318 .314 3.169* 
R² .176 .316 .381 .386 .414 .384 .422 
Notes: Standardized coefficients are shown (two-tailed, with directional hypothesis entries one-tailed); N = 66 start-ups, representing 142 founders;    
***. Significant at the .01 level   -   **. Significant at the .05 level   -   *. Significant at the .10 level. 
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Hypothesis 1a stated that the EFTs’ level of autonomous entrepreneurship motivation is 
positively associated with new venture ROA. Hypothesis 1b suggested a similar relationship 
for the EFTs’ level of controlled entrepreneurship motivation. Based on Model 3 of Table 2, 
we can corroborate both hypotheses. While the regression coefficient of EFT autonomous 
entrepreneurship motivation is significant and positive (β = .196), it appears not to be 
significantly different from the one representing EFT controlled motivation (β = .206). 
Consequently, we cannot conclude that an EFT’s level of autonomous entrepreneurship 
motivation exerts a stronger influence on new venture ROA than its level of controlled 
entrepreneurship motivation. Consequently, no support is found for Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3a suggested that EFT autonomous entrepreneurship motivation is 
positively associated with new ventures’ innovation performance. Model 10 of Table 3, 
however, indicates that this relationship is insignificant (β = -.018). Hypothesis 3a receives, 
therefore, no support. Hypothesis 3b suggested that the EFTs’ level of controlled 
entrepreneurship motivation is negatively associated with new venture innovation. Model 10 
of Table 3 empirically validates this hypothesis (β = -.279). We, thus, find support for 
Hypothesis 3b.  
Hypothesis 4a proposed that autonomous entrepreneurship motivation heterogeneity 
positively moderates the relationship between EFT autonomous motivation and new venture 
innovation. Hypothesis 4b stated the same for member controlled motivation heterogeneity 
regarding the relationship between EFT controlled motivation and new venture innovation. In 
other words, we expect teams with a higher level of entrepreneurship motivation to benefit 
from higher motivation heterogeneity in terms of new venture innovation, whereas teams 
with a lower level of entrepreneurship motivation should benefit from lower motivation 
heterogeneity. We learn from Models 11 to 14 of Table 3 that both cross-products involving 
motivation heterogeneity are positive and significant (β = .382; β = .273). The graphical 
representation of these interactions (Figures 1 and 2 below) confirms Hypotheses 4a and 4b.  
 
Figure 1. Interaction Effect of EFT Autonomous Entrepreneurship Motivation and 
Autonomous Entrepreneurship Motivation Heterogeneity on New Venture 
Innovation 
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Figure 2. Interaction Effect of EFT Controlled Entrepreneurship Motivation and 
Controlled Entrepreneurship Motivation Heterogeneity on New Venture Innovation 
 
Hypothesis 5a suggested that autonomous motivation heterogeneity acts as a negative 
moderator of the relationship between EFT autonomous entrepreneurship motivation and new 
venture ROA. Hypothesis 5b proposed a similar influence for controlled motivation 
heterogeneity on the relationship between EFT controlled motivation and new venture ROA. 
In other words, we assumed that the anticipated positive main effects of team 
entrepreneurship motivation on new venture ROA would be stronger if motivation 
heterogeneity is low, and weaker if it is high. As shown by Models 4 to 7 of Table 2, 
evidence only emerges for the cross-product involving controlled entrepreneurship 
motivation heterogeneity (β = -.369). The graphical representation of this interaction (Figure 
3 below) indicates that the relationship of EFT controlled entrepreneurship motivation with 
new venture ROA is negative for EFTs with higher controlled motivation heterogeneity, and 
positive for teams experiencing lower controlled motivation heterogeneity. Our results, thus, 
corroborate Hypothesis 5b, whereas no support is found for Hypothesis 5a. 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction Effect of EFT Controlled Entrepreneurship Motivation and 
Controlled Entrepreneurship Motivation Heterogeneity on New Venture Return on 
Assets 
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Discussion 
 
The research stream examining the complex relationship between team diversity and team 
outcomes is impressive in volume (Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007). Since most new ventures are 
founded by teams of entrepreneurs (McMullen et al., 2008), the importance of studying the 
performance effects of EFTs’ characteristics increases. The present study is to be situated in 
this domain. However, instead of focusing on bio-demographic EFT characteristics, we have 
explored deeper-level motivation drivers of new venture performance, which have been 
neglected in prior research (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Further, we introduced the aspect 
of EFT motivational diversity into our arguments. In doing so, we believe we may also claim 
to contribute to EFT diversity literature. 
The specific objective of this study was to empirically examine the extent to which 
entrepreneurship motivations of an entrepreneurial founding team affect new venture 
financial and innovation performance. We first tested EFTs’ level of autonomous and 
controlled entrepreneurship motivation as drivers of new venture return on assets and 
innovation. We then introduced and empirically estimated the effect of two moderators 
representing team motivation heterogeneity. Five main hypotheses were tested. In general, 
support for these hypotheses was substantial. First and foremost, the study’s results 
corroborate the distinction between autonomous and controlled entrepreneurship motivation. 
We have demonstrated that both types can generate different effects. We can, therefore, rally 
with Gagné and Deci (1995) against a unitary view on motivation. Our results also illustrate 
the importance of EFTs’ motivational diversity or heterogeneity for new venture 
performance. Deep-level diversity within EFTs is thus not to be neglected. We discuss our 
findings in two subsequent sections: EFT autonomous motivation and EFT controlled 
motivation. 
 
EFT autonomous motivation  
Within this study, a significant contribution of the EFTs’ level of autonomous 
entrepreneurship motivation to new venture return on assets emerged. Contrariwise, no 
significant link was found between the level of autonomous motivation and new venture 
innovation. The latter finding comes somewhat unexpectedly. We discern the following 
explanation for this absent link: Looking at Table 1, we observe that our sampled EFTs, on 
average, display a high level of autonomous motivation (76.56). The level of controlled 
motivation, on the other hand, is much lower (35.82), while its standard deviation is higher 
(17.11 vs. 14.86). Our sample is thus characterized by a high level of autonomous motivation.  
An explanation for the absent link lies in the close resemblance between becoming an 
entrepreneur (e.g., starting up a new venture) and the innovation activities within young 
organizations (e.g., bringing new goods and services to the market). By entering 
entrepreneurship, EFT members’ general tasks resemble the tasks to be done when pursuing 
innovation. Hence, it could be that the level of autonomous motivation within our sample is 
too high for any additional autonomous motivation to trigger innovation effects. Securing 
new venture return on assets, on the other hand, is far more of a managerial than a first-stage 
(young) entrepreneurial activity. Resemblance between entrepreneurship and the latter is, 
therefore, less outspoken, which allows for additional innovation effects to occur.    
Consistent with our assumptions, our results revealed that autonomous motivation 
heterogeneity acts as a positive moderator of the relationship between EFTs’ level of 
autonomous motivation and new venture innovation. In other words, high motivation 
heterogeneity was found to be instrumental to new venture innovation. Low heterogeneity, on 
the contrary, appeared to be detrimental. Regarding new ventures’ financial performance, no 
significant influence of autonomous motivation heterogeneity emerged. This finding seems to 
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indicate that only the level of EFTs’ autonomous entrepreneurship motivation affects new 
ventures’ wealth creation, and not the distribution of that motivation within the founding 
team. Again, this could be related to the aforementioned high level of EFTs’ autonomous 
motivation within our sample, combined with a relatively low degree of inter-member 
autonomous motivation heterogeneity (23.87; see Table 1). 
 
EFT controlled motivation  
Apart from internal or strongly internalized autonomous motives, our findings also shed light 
on several interesting control-oriented motivation effects. In line with our expectations, the 
level of controlled motivation was found to facilitate new ventures’ financial performance, as 
reflected in their return on assets, whereas it hindered their operational performance, in terms 
of firm innovations. As far as the interaction effects are concerned, both hypothesized 
relationships were corroborated by our results. While low control-oriented motivation 
heterogeneity facilitated new venture return on assets, it increasingly hindered new ventures’ 
ability to bringing new goods and services to the market. High motivation heterogeneity, on 
the other hand, was found to foster new venture innovation, yet at the expense of short-term 
firm financial performance.  
We point out that our findings did not reveal a stronger effect of autonomous 
entrepreneurship motivation on new venture financial performance compared to controlled 
entrepreneurship motivation. In search of an explanation for this unexpected outcome, we 
again turn to educational psychology literature. Within this strand of literature, it has been 
suggested that autonomous motivated individuals have a higher probability of adopting a 
long-term perspective (Watson et al., 1993). Control-oriented people, in contrast, tend to be 
reluctant to take any actions that could endanger contingent external rewards. Instead, they 
prefer to focus attention on the here and now (Erez et al., 1990). Although such a short-term 
time perspective does not particularly encourage EFTs’ contribution to long-term venture 
performance, it may trigger a contribution of controlled motivation to financial performance 
similar to the one of autonomous motivation. While we believe this to be a mere short-term 
outcome, additional research on this subject is imperative to empirically confirm this line of 
thought. 
All in all, we can say the levels of EFTs’ autonomous and controlled motivation 
generate different effects when it comes to innovation performance, yet similar (positive) 
effects regarding (short-term) financial performance. Furthermore, the (moderating) effects of 
both types of motivational heterogeneity run parallel for innovation performance, whereas 
they differ for financial performance. This implies that for studies focusing on understanding 
deeper-level drivers of new venture performance within multi-founder firms it is essential to 
consider not only the average level of the driver but also its heterogeneity within the 
entrepreneurial founding team. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
When interpreting our study findings, the following caveats should be recognized. First, 
because this study makes use of self-describing interview data, it might suffer from social 
desirability biases. However, we aimed to reduce possible biases by obtaining information 
from multiple respondents (all of the founders) and by supplementing self-describing 
information with more objective data (questionnaire and Bel-first data). Second, we only 
assessed the entrepreneurship motivation of successful business founders. Yet, motivational 
differences existing among nascent entrepreneurial team members could be very substantial, 
encouraging some members to quit the team, or to freeze differences in order to not 
jeopardize the emergence of the new firm. Future research could investigate these ideas 
through a longitudinal study of nascent EFT dynamics. In this respect, the social 
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categorization theory of team diversity could be adopted as well, next to the 
information/decision-making perspective. Hence, our sample could be biased with positive 
selection because it includes only teams that were successful in creating a new venture. Third, 
given the cross-sectional nature of our research design, we cannot prove the direction of the 
cause-effect relationships in our model. However, by making use of a data structure in which 
information on the dependent originates from a distinct database at a later point in time, we 
established that founding team characteristics precede new venture performance. Fourth, 
though the current study examines firms that are active within different industries, it does not 
shed light on ventures in the retail industry. With START 2009 being its fourth wave, the 
START research program has historically excluded the retail industry from its design, which 
in most economies is one of the major industries for small and new businesses. However, as 
the Belgian (and Flemish) economy is grounded in small and medium-sized businesses, with 
micro-businesses (< 10 employees) being especially prevailing (94%), the retail industry is 
typically not considered a dominant industry for new businesses in Belgium (European 
Commission, 2012). 
In conclusion, we distinguish the following recommendations for future research in 
this area, on top of those already mentioned above. First, we urge researchers to repeat this 
study’s moderator hypotheses for other new venture outcomes. Not only should this shed 
light on possible contradictory mechanisms, it may equally extend our knowledge on the 
contingencies that surround EFTs’ effectiveness. Further, following Horwitz and Horwitz 
(2007), we identify the exploration of possible curvilinear relationships between motivation 
level/heterogeneity and performance outcomes as an interesting and important line of 
research. Another promising research direction is to adopt other psychological constructs 
aimed at directly capturing unobservable team characteristics. For example, future 
contributions might investigate how trust and friendship among the business founders 
constitute important preconditions for team functioning. Alternatively, this research could 
advance our understanding of the impact of founding team heterogeneity on the development 
of network relationships and social ties, which already have been argued to benefit new 
ventures (Shane and Cable, 2002). Future research should also look into the role of team 
dynamics on new venture emergence and performance. Team composition is not always 
fixed. While our sampling conditions required interview responses from all members of the 
EFT, new members may join the founding team, while others might decide to leave it. In 
turn, these flows are likely to affect social integration and team coherence. They also reflect a 
transfer of knowledge, perspectives and resources, and the impact of these factors is not yet 
clearly understood. Moreover, we also advise future research to take the intermember 
relationships into account. Whereas motivation and motivational differences clearly are 
strong forces affecting team cohesion, other elements are also important in this respect. We 
could, for instance, think of family versus non-family linkages among EFT members and of 
the distribution of firm ownership among founders. Finally, research on founding team 
characteristics could include the moderating role of time on venture formation and 
emergence, as established by Steffens et al. (forthcoming). 
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Appendix 
Appendix Factor Loadings and Cronbach’s Alphas. 
Item 
External 
regulation 
Introjected 
regulation 
Controlled 
motivation 
Identified 
regulation 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
Autonomous 
motivation 
Environmental 
turbulence 
I put in effort because this allows me to make more money. .869 .237 .513 .229 .004 .201 / 
I put in effort to obtain more work security. .830 .346 .578 .398 .138 .355 / 
I put in effort because I would lose financial rewards otherwise. .606 .633 .741 .089 -.314 -.135 / 
I put in effort because I would feel ashamed otherwise. .309 .879 .780 .074 -.110 -.054 / 
I put in effort to avoid disappointment from others. .364 .845 .784 .203 -.067 .040 / 
I put in effort so that I would not have to feel guilty. .280 .837 .741 .128 -.082 -.012 / 
I put in effort because this entrepreneurial work matches with my personal values. .272 .170 .142 .348 .771 .707 / 
I put in effort because I find my entrepreneurial work very significant. .227 .075 .154 .856 .559 .778 / 
I put in effort because my entrepreneurial work allows me to reach my life goals. .351 .220 .345 .911 .354 .668 / 
I put in effort because I have fun doing this type of work. -.188 -.346 -.403 .358 .802 .702 / 
I put in effort because I enjoy this work very much. .110 -.033 -.017 .620 .695 .761 / 
I put in effort because I find entrepreneurial work extremely interesting. -.090 -.148 -.218 .451 .843 .772 / 
Within our industry the possibilities for technological innovations are considerable.  / / / / / / .672 
Within our industry a lot of opportunities for new products and/or new services exist. / / / / / / .766 
Within our industry customer demand for new products and/or new services is increasing. / / / / / / .814 
Within our industry the need for a new technology is growing. / / / / / / .852 
Within our industry the market for new products and/or new services is expanding. / / / / / / .714 
Our industry requires technological innovations in order to continue to grow. / / / / / / .759 
        
N 142 142 142 142 142 142 66 
Cronbach’s alpha .692 .851 .791 .729 .764 .827 .855 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis; Promax rotation; To compute both factors we made use of the following formula: F = ((S - V) / ((V x W) - V)) x 
100 with S equal to the sum of all initial values (before transformation), V referring to the number of variables and W representing the number of scale points (Maes et al., 
2005); The use of two distinct methods to collect the data (questionnaires and interviews) minimizes possible common-method variance effects. Open-ended questions were 
interspersed with other types of questions, which prevented respondents from adopting a scale-based pattern linked to Likert or semantic differential scales (Podsakoff et al., 
2003); Harman’s single factor test was used to examine concerns of possible common-method variance (interview information). Multiple factors with eigenvalues greater 
than one emerged. The first factor only explained 30.4% of the variance; Construct validity was established by developing measures from well-grounded theory (Barringer 
and Bluedorn, 1999); Confirmatory factor analysis was performed to assess the convergent and discriminant validity. The fit of the unconstrained two-factor model (including 
both constructs in a way that each item loaded solely on the factor for which it was an intended indicator) was reasonably good (e.g., GFI = .81) and better than the fit of the 
four-factor model (convergent validity). The pair-wise difference between the chi-squared value of the unconstrained model and that of the constrained model largely 
exceeded 3.84 (5% critical value) (discriminant validity) (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). 
